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Party challenging validity of grand jury subpoena duces tecum
has burden of proving that subpoenaed material is irrelevant to
grand jury investigation
A party wishing to challenge the validity of a grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum203 can obtain judicial relief by moving to quash
or vacate the subpoena. 04 When such a motion is predicated upon
the bad faith of the prosecutor, the courts normally place the bur-
den of establishing the invalidity of the subpoena upon the party
seeking relief.20 5 It has been unclear, however, upon whom the bur-
203 A subpoena duces tecum "requires production of books, papers and other things."
CPLR 2301 (1974); see In re Davidson's Estate, 89 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1949). The attorney general, or a special prosecutor appointed by him, has the authority,
upon the request of the governor, to initiate a grand jury investigation and issue subpoenas
duces tecum to compel production of any books or papers "which he deems relevant or
material to the inquiry." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(3), (8) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). Al-
though a showing of probable cause is unnecessary, see Windsor Park Nursing Home v.
Hynes, 56 App. Div. 2d 872, 872, 392 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (2d Dep't), modified on other
grounds, 42 N.Y.2d 243, 366 N.E.2d 813, 397 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1977), the subpoenaed materials
must be described with sufficient particularity, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Long Beach
Grandell Nursing Home v. Hynes), 93 Misc. 2d 117, 120, 402 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (Nassau
County Ct. 1978).
210 E.g., Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. 251, 258, 22 N.E.2d 360, 364 (1939); Manning v.
Valente, 272 App. Div. 359, 361, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77
N.E.2d 3 (1947); cf. In re Additional January 1979 Grand Jury (Albany Supreme Court v.
Doe), 50 N.Y.2d 14, 21, 405 N.E.2d 194, 200, 427 N.Y.S.2d 950, 955-56 (1980) (subpoena ad
testificandum). The proper method of challenging the subpoena is to make a motion to
quash or vacate. 2A WK&M 1 2304.03. The motion should be made promptly or, at the very
least, prior to the return date, and should be made in the court to which the subpoena is
returnable. Santangello v. People, 38 N.Y.2d 536, 539, 344 N.E.2d 404, 405, 381 N.Y.S.2d
472, 473 (1976); see also CPLR 2304 (1974). Any party affected by the subpoena may move
to quash it. In re Roden, 200 Misc. 513, 515, 106 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347-48 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1951).
20 In re Additional January 1979 Grand Jury (Albany Supreme Court v. Doe), 50
N.Y.2d at 20, 405 N.E.2d at 199, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 955; Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. at
361, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 92; see Maison & Co. v. Hynes, 50 App. Div. 2d 13, 16, 375 N.Y.S.2d
878, 880 (1st Dep't 1975). To enable the court to render a decision on the relevancy of the
requested items, sufficient information concerning the materials themselves and their rela-
tionship to the matter under investigation must be provided. Spector v. Allen, 281 N.Y. at
258, 22 N.E.2d at 364. It appears that at least two different standards as to what constitutes
sufficient information have been adopted. In Spector, for example, the Court held that the
district attorney need only reveal enough information so as to allow the court to essay an
"intelligent estimate" of its relevancy. Id. at 258, 22 N.E.2d at 364. This standard has been
followed in cases involving subpoenas which either compel the production of records or re-
quire a witness to appear and testify. See, e.g., Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. at 362, 72
N.Y.S.2d at 92; cf. Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 482, 255 N.E.2d 235, 239, 307 N.Y.S.2d
33, 38 (1969) (subpoena ad testificandum). A second standard was enunciated in People v.
Doe (Byk), 247 App. Div. 324, 326, 286 N.Y.S. 343, 346 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 473, 3
N.E.2d 875 (1936), in which the court stated that there must be a "justifiable suspicion"
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den of proof falls when the recipient of the subpoena asserts that
the materials sought are irrelevant to the grand jury's investiga-
tion.20 6 Recently, in Virag v. Hynes, 20 7 the Court of Appeals held
that a party contesting the validity of a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum on relevancy grounds bears the burden of demonstrating,
"by concrete evidence, that the materials sought have no relation
to the matter under investigation. 208
In Virag, the petitioners were served with subpoenas duces te-
cum requiring them to produce certain business records of their
adult home for consideration by the Nassau County grand jury.0 9
They moved to quash the subpoenas on the ground that the
records were irrelevant to the grand jury's investigation. 21 The
special assistant attorney general, in response to the petitioners'
motion, did not disclose the details of the investigation being con-
ducted.211 Relying upon the traditional presumption of validity ac-
corded grand jury subpoenas, she claimed that the burden rested
upon the petitioners to demonstrate the materials' irrelevancy.21 2
The Nassau County court granted the motion to quash the subpoe-
nas,21 3 and the Appellate Division, Second Department, unani-
mously affirmed,21 4 premising its decision upon the failure of the
deputy attorney general to disclose the relevance of the sub-
that the subpoenaed materials are related to the matter being investigated by the grand
jury. 247 App. Div. at 326, 286 N.Y.S. at 346.
206 Compare Cunningham & Kaming, P.C. v. Nadjari, 53 App. Div. 2d 520, 521, 384
N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (lst Dep't 1976) (some showing of relevance by the prosecutor is neces-
sary) with People v. Doe, 35 App. Div. 2d 118, 119-20, 315 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Dep't 1970)
(no affirmative burden placed upon prosecutor).
207 54 N.Y.2d 437, 430 N.E.2d 1249, 446 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1981).
208 Id. at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200.
209 Id. at 439, 430 N.E.2d at 1250, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The records included financial
statements, tax returns, personnel files, a partnership agreement, and all contracts between
the home and outside suppliers. Id. at 439-50 n.1, 430 N.E.2d at 1250 n.1, 446 N.Y.S.2d at
197 n.1.
211 Id. at 440, 430 N.E.2d at 1250, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 197. In their order to show cause, the
petitioners alleged that the deputy attorney general had received a complaint concerning
the death of one of the home's residents. Id. This single complaint, the petitioners asserted,
did not justify a "sweeping investigation of the financial and operating conditions" of their
home. Id.
" Id. Specifically, the special assistant attorney general submitted a sworn statement
alluding to a broad investigation to ascertain whether "crimes had been committed in the
operation of the ... [h]ome." Id. She negated the petitioners' averment that the investiga-
tion was a result of an elderly woman's death. Id.
212 Id.
212 See id. at 440-41, 430 N.E.2d at 1250-51, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 197-98.
214 80 App. Div. 2d 912, 437 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1981).
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poenas. 15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the ap-
pellate division.216 Recognizing that grand jury subpoenas enjoy a
presumption of validity, Judge Jasen, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated that in order to overcome this presumption,1 7 the
contesting party must prove that the subpoenaed materials are to-
tally unrelated to the matter being investigated by the grand
jury.218 Additionally, the Court noted that because grand juries
have limited investigatory resources, the term "relevancy," as ap-
plied in the context of grand jury investigations, is necessarily
broader in scope "than when applied to evidence at trial. ' 21 9 This,
the Court reasoned, necessitates giving grand juries a "fair margin
of reach" in gathering material. 220 Furthermore, Judge Jasen ob-
served that, as a practical matter, to lessen the contesting party's
burden would result in excessive litigation, thereby impeding the
215 Id. Though the appellate division agreed that the special prosecutor was not obliged
to disclose publicly the nature of the investigation, id., it nevertheless observed that an in
camera disclosure could have been made. Id. at 912-13, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
21. 54 N.Y.2d at 441, 430 N.E.2d at 1251, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
2 Id. at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The Court noted that the pre-
sumption of validity conferred upon grand jury subpoenas is partly an outgrowth of the
presumption of regularity accorded to official acts of persons serving under an oath of office.
Id. at 443, 430 N.E.2d at 1252, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 199. Additionally, the Court observed that
the presumption of validity arises from the broad investigatory powers of the grand jury. Id.
2,1 Id. at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The Court distinguished a non-
judicial "office" subpoena from a subpoena issued by a grand jury. Id. at 441, 430 N.E.2d at
1251, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 198. With respect to an office subpoena, the Court asserted that since
there is no judicial supervision either in the issuance of the subpoena or in the questioning
of the witness, the burden is on the issuer to establish the relevancy of the subpoenaed
items. Id. at 441-42, 430 N.E.2d at 1251, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 198. To satisfy this burden, the
Court stated, the issuer need only demonstrate that the requested materials have "a reason-
able relation to the subject matter under investigation and to the public purpose to be
achieved." Id. at 442, 430 N.E.2d at 1251, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (quoting Carlisle v. Bennett,
268 N.Y. 212, 217, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935)). Concerning a grand jury subpoena duces te-
cum, however, the Court noted that because of its presumption of validity, "[blare asser-
tions of the lack of relevancy will not suffice." 54 N.Y.2d at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 200.
The Court also distinguished the situation in which a prosecutor attempts to hold a
witness in contempt for refusing to comply with a subpoena. Id. at 445, 430 N.E.2d at 1253,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. In this instance, the Court remarked, it is incumbent upon the prose-
cutor to submit sufficient information about the nature of the investigation and its relation
to the subpoenaed materials to enable the court to make an "intelligent estimate" of rele-
vancy. Id.
219 54 N.Y.2d at 444, 430 N.E.2d at 1252, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
220 Id. (quoting Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956)).
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progress of a legitimate investigation.221 The Court thus concluded
that although the burden imposed upon the challenging party is
stringent, such placement of the burden is nevertheless essential to
the proper functioning of the investigatory process. 222
While the Virag decision imposes a harsh burden upon sub-
poena recipients who legitimately doubt the relevancy of requested
materials, 2 3 the harshness of this burden is aggravated by the se-
crecy requirement of grand jury proceedings2 24 in that it will be
difficult for a subpoenaed party to establish the irrelevancy of re-
quested evidence if the nature of the grand jury's investigation is
undisclosed.225 As an alternative, some federal courts have held
22"1 54 N.Y.2d at 443-44, 430 N.E.2d at 1252, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 199. Several other courts
have expressed the concern that the broad investigatory process of the grand jury would be
unduly impeded by frivolous litigation. See, e.g., McGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 119-21,
412 N.E.2d 376, 377-78, 432 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691-92 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981);
Cunningham & Kaming, P.C. v. Nadjari, 53 App. Div. 2d 520, 521, 384 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384
(1st Dep't 1976); Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. 359, 362, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 93 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947). Notably, the hindrance of grand jury investigations
of nursing homes is a common problem. See C. HYNES, PROFIT MAKING LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITIES 32-33 (1978).
222 54 N.Y.2d at 445, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The Court reasoned that
continual delays generated by "unmeritorious" motions to quash and subsequent appeals
might lead to fading memories and loss of evidence. Id. at 443, 430 N.E.2d at 1252, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 199.
222 See id. at 445, 430 N.E.2d at 1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The Virag Court stated that
other courts have devised standards by which the presumption of validity of a subpoena
duces tecum can be overcome. Id. One tribunal, the Court stated, required that "'the docu-
ments... [must be] so unrelated to the subject of inquiry as to make it obvious that their
production would be futile as an aid to the' Grand Jury's investigation." Id. (citing Manning
v. Valente, 272 App. Div. 358, 361, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (1st Dep't), af'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77
N.E.2d 3 (1947)); see Carvel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 284, 290, 431 N.Y.S.2d 609,
614 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1979), af'd, 77 App. Div. 2d 872, 431 N.Y.S.2d 615 (2d
Dep't 1980); see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 448 F. Supp. 822, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
224 CPL § 190.25(4) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1981-1982). The five reasons which have
been advanced to justify secrecy of grand jury proceedings are: (1) prevention of flight of
potential indictees; (2) prevention of interference with the grand jurors by prospective in-
dictees; (3) prevention of procurement of perjury; (4) protection of innocent parties who
have been called to testify but have not been indicted; and (5) assurance for prospective
witnesses that their testimony will remain confidential. People v. Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d 229,
235, 265 N.E.2d 449, 452, 316 N.Y.S.2d 622, 625-26 (1970); L. PAPERNO & A. GOLDSTEIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 133, at 225-30 (1960). For an historical perspective of
the secrecy requirement of grand jury proceedings, see Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand
Jury Secrecy, I J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 18, 18-20 (1967); see also 1977 UTAH L. REV. 170,
171-74.
225 In Virag, the Court denied the motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum on the
ground that the contesting parties were unable to establish that the requested materials
were totally irrelevant to the grand jury's investigation. See 54 N.Y.2d at 445, 430 N.E.2d at
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that the prosecutor bears the initial burden, though slight, of dem-
onstrating the relevancy of the subpoenaed materials.22 It is sug-
gested that this approach, which was followed by the appellate di-
vision in Virag227 is necessary to protect the privacy rights of a
subpoenaed party.
It further appears that the Virag decision, by placing the ini-
tial burden of establishing irrelevancy on the party challenging a
subpoena duces tecum, has greatly enhanced the potential for
1253, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 200. The contestants, however, were forced to speculate as to the
grand jury's purpose for requesting the items. See id. At least one other court has acknowl-
edged that a conflict exists between requiring a challenging party to establish irrelevancy
and the secrecy requirement of grand jury proceedings. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 450
F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the court held:
Because the secrecy attendant upon grand jury proceedings precludes the target of
a subpoena from knowing the status of the investigation of which the subpoena is
a part, it is appropriate to require the grand jury to bear the burden of demon-
strating the relevance of the demanded material to the investigation.
Id. (emphasis added); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973)
(secrecy of grand jury proceedings necessarily suggests that the party seeking judicial en-
forcement of the subpoena be required "to make some minimum showing of the existence of
a proper purpose").
228 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Impanelled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543, 549 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963, 965-67 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 391 F. Supp. 991
(D.R.I. 1975), the court enunciated the following three-prong test to determine whether a
prosecutor has satisfied the initial burden of establishing the relevancy of requested
materials:
(1) The existence of a grand jury investigation [must be proved by the prosecu-
tor], and
(2) The nature and subject matter of said investigation [must be disclosed by the
government]-this requirement is satisfied by the mere recitation of the generic
nature of the subject matter under investigation ....
(3) [The prosecutor must establish] [t]he fact that the subpoenaed documents
bear a general relation to the subject matter of the grand jury investigation in
question.
Id. at 997 (citations omitted). The court also stressed that the term "relevancy" should be
construed broadly when applied in the context of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. Id. at
998. Once the burden of establishing relevancy is satisfied, the court observed, no additional
information may be obtained by the contesting party as to the nature of the grand jury's
investigation. Id. at 995; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 446 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 n.5
(N.D.N.Y. 1978) (the method prescribed in Allen is the "fairest and least intrusive ap-
proach"). Several subsequent federal court cases, however, have not been consistent. See In
re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor need not establish relevancy); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor does not bear the
burden of proving relevancy); see also In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980)
(three-prong test may be adopted in the future); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 184 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975) (relevancy and materiality play no role in a grand jury
investigation).
227 80 App. Div. 2d 912, 437 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1981).
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prosecutorial abuse of the power to subpoena.22 As a result, wit-
nesses will be forced to rely upon the prosecutor's good faith judg-
ment as to relevancy and comply with the subpoena duces te-
cum, 2 29 or be subject to criminal contempt proceedings.23 0 It is
submitted that this stricture provides an additional reason for
placing the burden to establish the relevancy of requested items
upon the prosecutor.23'
Sherri M. Tepperman
Retention of counsel in connection with grand jury inquiry does
not preclude subsequent investigation, in the absence of counsel,
which uncovers new crimes
The fulcrum of the New York courts' enforcement of a crimi-
228 Traditionally, it has been considered important for the grand jury, while serving in
its investigatory capacity, to be impartial, thereby protecting the rights of private citizens.
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Ideally, the grand
jury should not be a tool of the government or the courts, but rather an instrument to be
used for the benefit of the people. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 174, 175-77 (1963). In recent years, however, prosecutorial domination of the grand jury
has increased. See People v. Colebut, 86 Misc. 2d 729, 734-35, 383 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Murov, An Examination of the Grand Jury: Inquest and Quest, 51
N.Y.S.B.J. 115, 116-17 (1979).
229 The Virag Court noted that there is a presumption of regularity accorded to official
acts of individuals functioning under an oath of office. 54 N.Y.2d at 443, 430 N.E.2d at 1252,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200; W. RICHARDSON, supra note 197, § 72, at 49. The potential exists,
however, for prosecutors to act overzealously, especially during investigations of nursing
homes, where widespread abuse of the Medicaid system has already been uncovered. See C.
HYNES, supra note 221, at 36-50; Murov, supra note 228, at 134.
221 If a witness fails to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum, he is subject to
a criminal contempt citation. Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. 358, 361, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88,
92 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 681, 77 N.E.2d 3 (1947); see 9 N.Y. JUR. Contempt § 47
(1960).
231 Interestingly, the burden to establish relevancy has been placed upon the prosecutor
in the context of subpoenas ad testificandum (subpoena to testify). In In re Additional Jan-
uary 1979 Grand Jury (Albany Supreme Court v. Doe), 50 N.Y.2d 14, 405 N.E.2d 194, 427
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1980), for example, the Court reiterated the proposition that a witness may
not be compelled to answer irrelevant questions. Id. at 21, 405 N.E.2d at 199-200, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 955. Indeed, if a witness "harbors a reasonable suspicion" that a line of ques-
tioning is irrelevant, the court may be called upon to determine the validity of that suspi-
cion. Id. The onus is then placed upon the prosecutor to demonstrate the relevancy of his
inquiries. Id. It is submitted that this rule should be extended to cover witnesses who doubt
the relevancy of requested materials.
